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No. 20170436-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.

DAVID BRUCE BUTTARS,
Defendant/Appellant.
__________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
Buttars raises five issues on appeal. In conjunction with his opening brief, Buttars
also filed a rule 23B motion that specifically pertains to Point I.C. of his opening brief.
The State does not contend that the existing record is inadequate to address Point I.C.
Because the parties appear to agree that Point I.C. may be reached on the existing record,
this Court may resolve the case on the present record without addressing the 23B motion.
And for the reasons here and in opening, this Court should reverse and remand for a new
trial.
This reply is “limited to responding to the facts and arguments raised in the
appellee’s... principal brief.” Utah R. App. P. 24(b). Buttars does not concede any matters
not addressed in this reply but believes those matters are adequately addressed in the
principle brief.

ARGUMENT
I. The bank record evidence was inadmissible.
A. The court erred in failing to suppress the bank record evidence.
The State unconstitutionally seized Buttars’s protected bank records via an
investigatory subpoena without providing notice to Buttars and without making the
showing necessary to keep the subpoena secret. The State argues that the seizure did not
violate Buttars’s constitutional rights and that suppression is unwarranted. SB, 21-38. For
the reasons below, the State is incorrect. 1
1. The State unlawfully seized Buttars’s bank records.
The State’s use of unlawful subpoenas to seize Buttars’s protected bank records
was unreasonable under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The State
primarily argues that the subpoenas were lawful because they were “issued according to
[the SPA’s requirements]—the district court approved the investigation upon a showing
of good cause, the prosecutor applied to the district court for each subpoena, and the
district court authorized each one.” State’s Brief (SB), 25. The State’s argument fails
because it (1) overlooks the need for additional procedures when protected or privileged
information is subpoenaed; (2) overemphasizes the significance of the court’s judicial
approval of the subpoenas; and (3) downplays the import of the erroneous secrecy order.
First, the protected nature of Buttars’s bank records must be considered in
determining lawfulness. State actors can use SPA subpoenas to obtain broad swaths of
The State does not assert that admission of the bank records was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt., 2012 UT 17, ¶¶19-20,
279 P.3d 391.
1
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information. But there are recognized privacy protections that accompany information
like bank records and medical records that simply do not apply to other types of
information that may be sought under the SPA. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415,
416-18 (Utah 1991).
The State does not account for the differences between protected and unprotected
information. And while the SPA does not draw such a distinction either, that does not
mean that the differences are irrelevant to the lawfulness question. Indeed, our
constitutions may hold the State to a higher standard when a protected interest is at stake
than when there is no expectation of privacy. See State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶23, 203
P.3d 1000.
Our supreme court has recognized that defendants enjoy a privacy interest in their
bank records and has afforded defendants standing to object to subpoenas issued to thirdparty banks. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 416-18. And it makes sense why it would do so.
Bank records, after all, allow the government to discern more than just a generic ledger of
financial information. “‘[I]t is reasonable for our citizens to expect that their bank records
will be protected from disclosure because in the course of bank dealings, a depositor
reveals many aspects of her personal affairs, opinion, habit and associations which
provide a current biography of her activities.’” Id.
Given the protected status of Buttars’s bank records, the State needed to employ
subpoena procedures that adequately safeguarded Buttars’s privacy interests; it needed to
provide him with notice and a meaningful opportunity to object. In State v. Yount, for
instance, this Court determined that the State’s failure to “notify Defendant of the
3

subpoenas for his medical records was a violation of his rights and rendered the
subpoenas invalid.” 2008 UT App 102, ¶¶1, 16, 182 P.3d 405. As in Yount, Buttars’s
bank records were protected and the failure to provide notice rendered the subpoenas
unlawful.
Contrary to the State’s claims, it is of little consequence that the SPA does not
expressly include a notice requirement. The requirements of notice and a precompliance
opportunity to object find their roots in the constitution—namely the due process clause.
Id. ¶13. Indeed “due process concerns arise where no notice is given to the party whose
confidential or privileged records are subpoenaed.” Id. This makes sense. When the State
confers a privilege or entitlement—in this case, a privacy interest in one’s bank records—
“such entitlement constitutes a property interest, which is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598,
601 (Utah 1980). And “every significant deprivation… of an interest, which is qualified
as ‘property’ under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of case, absent extraordinary or unusual
circumstances.” Id. The protected status of Buttars’s records, then, implicates due process
concerns that dictate the need for notice and a precompliance opportunity to object.
The State nevertheless stresses that the secret subpoenas were lawful because they
were issued after judicial approval and upon a showing of good cause to conduct the
investigation. SB, 24-25. It further argues that the “good cause basis for the investigation,
or the bank records relevance to that investigation” are “the only factors that could make
the subpoenas unlawful or the seizure unreasonable.” SB, 26. The State is mistaken.
4

The provision of notice is an important element of the lawfulness and
reasonableness inquiry. And deprivations of notice may render a subpoena unlawful.
Yount recognized this, holding that “the State's failure to notify [the] [d]efendant of the
subpoenas for his medical records was a violation of his rights and rendered the
subpoenas invalid.” 2008 UT App 102, ¶16. The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise
recognized that in some circumstances, a search and seizure might be defective if officers
intrude on private spaces without prior announcement or notice. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927, 936 (1995). Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that notice to targets of
a physical search or seizure “forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 929; Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir.
2012) (“[T]he government may not take property like a thief in the night; rather, it must
announce its intentions and give the property owner a chance to argue against the
taking.”). Thus, the State is wrong to suggest that the court’s underlying good cause
determination is the only basis for deeming the subpoenas unlawful or unreasonable.
Nor does judicial approval render the subpoenas lawful. In Yount, this Court
determined the subpoenas were invalid even though the “prosecutor submitted an
affidavit of probable cause and received judicial authorization.” 2008 UT App 102, ¶1.
Similarly here, mere judicial authorization under the SPA—without more—does not save
the subpoenas from invalidity. Moreover, it is worth noting that under the SPA, the
“substantive standards may be lower than in ordinary criminal prosecutions.” In re
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 646 (Utah 1988). “[O]n its face it appears that the
[SPA’s ‘good cause’ standard] may not require the same showing of probable cause that
5

is necessary to bring a criminal charge, and the [SPA] does not expressly require an
allegation of any specific criminal violation.” Id. Thus, the subpoenas issued to Buttars’s
banks pursuant to the “good cause” standard were authorized using an even lower
standard than the Yount subpoenas, which were supported by an affidavit of probable
cause. 2008 UT App 102, ¶1.
Finally, the State downplays the significance of the erroneously included secrecy
order in the lawfulness inquiry. SB, 30-40. Even though the State secured judicial
approval, the fact remains that the State issued secret subpoenas without complying with
the specific provisions of the SPA—provisions that were specifically enacted in response
to the constitutional concerns raised by the supreme court in Criminal Investigation, 754
P.2d at 656. Indeed, Criminal Investigation suggests—contrary to the State’s claim, see
SB, 26, 30—that the erroneous inclusion of a secrecy provision undermines the
lawfulness of a subpoena.
In Criminal Investigation, our supreme court addressed the secrecy provisions of a
previous version of the SPA and interpreted them to avoid an unconstitutional
construction. In doing so, the court gave the SPA’s secrecy provisions a limiting
construction, requiring “that the state's attorney apply for and that the court issue a
secrecy order” as to each item to be kept secret. Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 656.
It also concluded that the “state must make a showing justifying such a secrecy order.”
Id. Specifically, the State needed to demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood that publicly
releasing information about the identity of a witness or the substance of the evidence
resulting from a subpoena or interrogation would pose a threat of harm to someone or
6

otherwise impede the investigation.” Id. Through its limiting interpretations and with the
procedural protections imposed, the Criminal Investigation court determined that the act
survived constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 658. Following Criminal Investigation, the
legislature amended the SPA to adopt the procedural protections imposed by the supreme
court, including the requirement that the State must justify a secrecy order before the
district court and meet the requisite showing. Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 916
(Utah 1998); Utah Code §77-22-2(6)(a)(i).
Much of the State’s argument hinges on the notion that the subpoenas were lawful
because the State complied with the SPA. But it did not. Instead, it shrouded the
subpoenas in secrecy without complying with the requisite procedures—procedures that
our supreme court specifically read in to save the act from unconstitutionality. The
statutory procedures for issuing a secret subpoena are not unimportant, technical
requirements, but are necessary to avoid serious constitutional issues. And the supreme
court had good reason to require the State to justify its use of a secret subpoena. After all,
the unjustified and arbitrary use of secret subpoenas raises significant First Amendment
concerns that implicate a defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The secret subpoenas prohibited, ex ante, Buttars’s banks from engaging in core
protected speech under the First Amendment, i.e., speech about the State’s access to a
customers’ sensitive records and its use of warrantless procedures to do so. Indeed, “there
is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
7

While Buttars’s banks and the public at large suffer from such unjustified stifling of
speech, Buttars particularly suffers. The unjustified silencing of Buttars’s banks
prevented the banks from communicating with Buttars about the subpoenas, leaving
Buttars without the information he needed to keep his bank records private and prevent
the State from intruding into his private affairs. With the serious consequences of secrecy
at play, it is incumbent on the State follow the appropriate procedures. The State failed to
do so in this case. This failure strongly counts against the lawfulness of the subpoenas
and the reasonableness of the seizure. 2
2. The violation requires suppression.
Thompson and Yount held that exclusion was the appropriate remedy for evidence
obtained via unlawful subpoenas. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419-20; Yount, 2008 UT App

The State mentions that Buttars did not produce evidence that he would have
known about the subpoenas but for the erroneous secrecy order. SB, 30. To the extent this
matters, Buttars notes that the State bore the burden below of establishing the
reasonableness of its actions. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶40, 164 P.3d 397. And
the State did not produce any evidence that the erroneous secrecy order did not sway the
banks’ decision to produce the bank records without notice. Any dearth of evidence in
this regard does not work in the State’s favor. Id.
2

In any event, it is reasonably likely that but for the secrecy order, the banks would
have notified Buttars of the subpoenas. Our supreme court has recognized that defendants
enjoy a privacy interest in their bank records. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 416-18. Utah law
does not prohibit banks (absent a secrecy order) from providing notice. See Utah Code
§77-22-2. Moreover, federal law—though not controlling of State-issued subpoenas—
requires that customers be notified when the government requests bank records. 12
U.S.C.A. §3405. Our system of laws clearly values the privacy of bank records and
fosters an environment where, absent a secrecy order, the banks would be inclined to give
notice.

8

102, ¶24. The State argues that these cases were decided incorrectly and that the Utah
Constitution does not require an exclusionary remedy for violations of Article I, Section
14. SB, 32-34. But the State correctly acknowledges that this Court is bound to follow
Utah Supreme Court precedent. SB, 32 n.2. And Thompson—a Utah Supreme Court
case—controls. Thus, the bank record evidence must be excluded pursuant to the
reasoning set forth in Thompson.
The State also argues that the good faith exception applies. Assuming a good faith
exception even exists in this context, it does not apply for the reasons stated in opening,
see Opening Brief (OB), 26-27, and for the reasons articulated in Yount, 2008 UT App
102, ¶26 n.3. The State nevertheless argues that Yount is inapplicable because the
subpoenas in that case were issued under civil rule 45, and rule 45 “requires no judicial
oversight upon which one could reasonable rely.” SB, 38. While rule 45 subpoenas might
not require judicial approval, a district court in Yount nevertheless authorized the
subpoena—much like it did here. 2008 UT App 102, ¶¶5, 26 n.3. Thus, contrary to the
State’s claims, Yount involved a subpoena issued with judicial oversight and supports
Buttars’s argument that the good faith exception is inapplicable.
B. The court erred in admitting Exhibits 26-32 because the underlying bank
records constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The bank records fail to qualify under a hearsay exception and Buttars was
prejudiced by their admission. The State’s contrary contentions are not persuasive.

9

1. The residual exception did not apply; thus, the bank records constituted
inadmissible hearsay.
The trial court correctly determined that the Frontier records did not qualify under
rule 803(6)’s business records exception. But it incorrectly determined that they were
admissible under rule 807’s residual exception. The State asserts that the bank records
were admissible under both rule 803(6) and rule 807. SB, 39-51. For one batch of
records—the Frontier records of the Ellipse account and Buttars’s personal account (the
Ellipse/personal account batch)—it argues rule 803(6) as an alternative ground for
admissibility. SB, 39-41. And for another batch of records—the Frontier records of the
MovieBlitz account (the MovieBlitz batch)—it argues that the trial court properly
admitted the records under rule 807. SB, 41-51. This Court should reject rule 803(6) as an
alternate ground for affirmance. Moreover, the State’s arguments under the residual
exception are unconvincing.
Alternate ground for affirmance. Although this court may affirm on alternate
grounds, “it falls to the party seeking the benefit of the rule to explain why it is eligible to
have the alternative arguments considered.” Francis v. Div. of Wildlife, 2010 UT 62, ¶21,
248 P.3d 44. The supreme has “caution[ed]” that “the ‘affirm on any ground’ rule of
appellate review… is a tool available only in limited circumstances.” Bailey v. Bayles,
2002 UT 58, ¶13 n.3, 52 P.3d 1158. This Court “may do so only where the alternate
ground is apparent on the record.” Id. ¶20. Additionally, this Court “must [] determine
whether the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain the decision of the
trial court on the alternate ground.” Id.; Angel Inv'rs v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ¶38, 216
10

P.3d 944. In determining whether the alternate theory is factually sustainable, “[t]he court
of appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may not find new
facts or reweigh the evidence.” Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ¶20; Angel Inv'rs, 2009 UT 40, ¶38.
Here, the State’s alternate ground for affirmance does not rest on the facts as
found by the trial court. The State presumes that the Ellipse/personal account batch is
admissible under rule 803(6) because the records were accompanied by custodian
certificates. SB, 39-41. But the trial court found that the evidence was not so clear. On the
contrary, it found that “it [wa]s unclear from the testimony and evidence what certificates
go with which batch.” R.3197. The State has not challenged this finding, even though it
bears the burden of demonstrating that its alternate ground for affirmance is appropriate.
On this record, it is inappropriate to second guess the trial court and conclude that the
Ellipse/personal account batch was properly accompanied by custodian certificates.
Accordingly, this Court should reject the State’s alternate ground for affirmance.
Residual Exception. The State did not produce the custodian certificates necessary
to satisfy rule 803(6). When the defense pointed out that the certificates were missing, it
did not call the records custodian to establish the requisite foundation. Nor does the
record reveal any attempt on the part of the State to do so. On the contrary, the State took
the position that it “d[id] not have to bring in a records custodian.” R.3136. The State
then turned to rule 807. But instead of producing the bank records themselves, the State
produced summaries prepared by its own expert, leaving the trial court without any
opportunity to examine the trustworthiness of the actual documents. Under these
circumstances, the trial court erred in admitting the records under rule 807.
11

The State disagrees and supports its position by (1) pointing to extra-jurisdictional
cases upholding the admissibility of bank records under the residual exception, SB, 4243; (2) distinguishing State v. Clopten, SB, 46-47; and (3) asserting that “there was no
more probative evidence to establish Buttars’s use of investor funds.” SB, 48. The State’s
claims fail.
First, the cases cited by the State do not address circumstances like those presented
here. Indeed, these cases involve situations where the trial court examined the actual
records—not state-prepared summaries—and/or where the State made a showing that it
was unable to secure the testimony of a records custodian.
In U.S. v. Turner, the court had the benefit of the actual bank records. 718 F.3d
226, 233 (3d Cir. 2013). And it held that the bank records were admissible after
determining, inter alia, that the “documents ha[d] the official appearance of bank
records” and “[t]hey b[ore] the insignia of foreign banks.” Id. The court in Karme v.
Comm'r likewise had the actual bank records before it, 673 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.
1982) (“The records were placed into evidence”), and the same appears to be true in U.S.
v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2001). In this case by contrast, the State merely
introduced summaries of the bank records, giving the trial court no occasion to inspect
the actual documents and ascertain trustworthiness.
Additionally, in Wilson, the State demonstrated a need to resort to rule 807
because there was no custodian available to testify. Id. These circumstances are unlike
those in this case, where the State made no showing of need, but instead took the position
that it “d[id] not have to bring in a records custodian.” R.3136.
12

Moreover, while the above cases held that evidence failing under rule 803(6) or
another categorical exception was nevertheless admissible under rule 807, other courts
have held the opposite. E.g., U.S. v. Turner, 104 F.3d 217, 221 (8th
Cir.1997) (“introduce[ing] the medical texts under [the residual exception], when… [rule]
803(18) specifically deals with the admissibility of this type of evidence, would
circumvent the general purposes of the rules.”); Bryndle v. Boulevard Towers, 132 F.
Supp. 3d 486, 497 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Rule 807 is not intended to address situations
already covered by Rules 803 or 804, such as the business record exception to hearsay
recognized by Rule 803(6)”); see also Conoco v. DOE, 99 F.3d 387, 392-93
(Fed.Cir.1997); Lakah v. UBS AG, 996 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Glowczenski v. Taser, 928 F. Supp. 2d 564, 573 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd in part, dismissed
in part, 594 F. App'x 723, (2d Cir. 2014); In re Denslow, 104 B.R. 761, 766 (E.D. Va.
1989); U.S. v. Barrett, 598 F. Supp. 469, 482 (D. Me. 1984), aff'd, 766 F.2d 609 (1st Cir.
1985).
Second, the State attempts to distinguish Clopten, 2015 UT 82, 362 P.3d 1216,
arguing that the “bank records… are unlike the oral statements in Clopten that were made
by a person who could lie.” SB, 47. But it is important to point out that the actual bank
records were not before the trial court. Instead, the court examined trustworthiness based
on extrinsic evidence, including Curtis’s testimony and the embellished summaries. And
this evidence was susceptible to the gloss of the State, as the summaries reveal. See OB,
45-49; see also Conoco, 99 F.3d at 392-93 (distinguishing summaries from bank records
and holding summaries inadmissible under the residual exception for lack of
13

trustworthiness); U.S. v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 760-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The embellished
summaries and Curtis’s testimony might have related to the bank records, but the
evidence was still extrinsic to the actual documents themselves. Thus, this case is similar
to Clopten where extrinsic evidence did not satisfy the trustworthiness prong. 2015 UT
82, ¶25.
Third, the State argues that “there was no more probative evidence to establish
Buttars’s use of investor funds.” SB, 48. It minimizes the importance of the custodial
certifications in the analysis, and steers the court away from considering the probative
value of the bank records properly accompanied by custodial certifications. Id. But a
custodial certification ensures the reliability of the bank records, which in turn heightens
their probative value. See OB, 38-39. Given two identical sets of bank records—with one
set certified as being regular entries made near the time of the transaction and kept in the
ordinary course of business—the certified set will be more probative because it is more
reliable. Yet, the State did not demonstrate reasonable efforts to produce certified bank
records (or produce the underlying documents themselves), which was the most reliable
and probative evidence of Buttars’s expenditures. See OB, 38-39; see also N.D. v. A.B.,
2003 UT App 215, ¶18, 73 P.3d 971; Barry v. Trustees, 467 F. Supp. 2d 91, 104-05
(D.D.C. 2006). The State’s reasonable efforts to satisfy rule 803(6) also has bearing on
rule 807’s “not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803” language, which
contemplates that rule 807 is available only when the other exceptions are not. Utah R.
Evid. 807. If the State does not demonstrate reasonable efforts to procure the testimony of
a records custodian as required by rule 803(6)—as was the case here—then the court
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lacks assurance that the records are “not specifically covered” by the business records
exception. Under these circumstances, the residual exception is unavailable. Brown v.
Crown Equip., 445 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67 (D. Me. 2006). Thus, this Court should hold that
the bank records were inadmissible under the residual exception.
2. Prejudice.
The State incorrectly asserts that admitting the bank records under rule 807 was
harmless. SB, 51-52. It argues that if the records were not admitted under rule 807, the
State “could have either gone back to the bank to obtain custodial certifications or called
a witness to testify and establish the requirements of rule 803(6).” SB, 51. The State’s
argument essentially boils down to, “if we hadn’t done it wrong, we would have done it
right.” But the record does not reveal that the State would have done it right. Quite the
opposite. Admissibility under rule 803(6) was litigated extensively. OB, 14-16. The State
was well aware that the absent custodial certifications posed a problem under rule 803(6).
See R.910-23. But the State did not seek to cure that problem by obtaining the missing
certifications or calling a records custodian to testify. The State had the opportunity to
support its case for admissibility under 803(6), but for whatever reason did not do so. On
this record, it cannot be said that the State would have sought and obtained admission
under rule 803(6).
The State also cites State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, 365 P.3d 699, in support of its
position. But McNeil is distinguishable. In McNeil, our supreme court held that the
defendant failed to show prejudice where the record revealed that the State would have
been able to properly lay foundation for the admission of telephone records. Id. ¶¶39-42.
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There, the prosecutor revealed two separate paths for admitting telephone records: (1)
through a detective’s testimony or (2) through a phone provider employee’s testimony.
Id. ¶40. When the trial court admitted the records on the first basis, the State did not
pursue admissibility through the phone provider’s testimony because the court’s ruling
rendered doing so unnecessary. Id. The McNeil court nevertheless determined that even if
the trial court erred in admitting the telephone records, the State would have been able to
establish foundation by way of the phone provider employee’s testimony. In reaching this
conclusion, it pointed to supporting record evidence, including evidence that the State
issued a subpoena to the phone provider and evidence that the State was prepared to call
the telephone provider employee as a witness. Id. ¶¶39-40.
This case is readily distinguishable. Here, the State’s reason for not securing
admission under rule 803(6) was not the trial court’s ruling—as was the case in McNeil—
but a failed effort to establish the requisite foundation. It is not reasonable to presume that
the State would have succeeded in satisfying rule 803(6) after failing to do when it had
the opportunity. Moreover, unlike McNeil, where record evidence demonstrated that the
State would be able to lay the requisite foundation, the present record reveals no evidence
that the State would have been able to produce the missing custodial certificates or a
custodian’s testimony. Id. Thus, the record does not demonstrate that the State would
have been able to lay the proper foundation under rule 803(6). This Court should hold
that admission of the records under rule 807 was prejudicial.
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C. Exhibits 26-32 were inadmissible under rule 1006 because they did not prove
the content of the underlying bank records.
In opening, Buttars argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
embellished summaries because they did not prove the content of the underlying bank
records. In an abundance of caution, Buttars filed a 23B motion containing supplemental
facts relevant this issue. The State does not contend that the existing record is inadequate
to address this issue. Accordingly, this Court need not address the 23B motion and may
decide this issue on the existing record.
The State nevertheless asserts that this issue does not merit reversal. It argues that
counsel did not perform deficiently because “Curtis was clear to testify that expenses he
labeled as ‘questionable’ could be legitimate” and the categorization was used to
Buttars’s advantage. SB, 60-61. Moreover, it argues that Buttars did not demonstrate
prejudice and relies on U.S v. Spaulding, 894 F.3d 173, 185-86 (5th Cir. 2018) to support
its position. The State’s arguments are unpersuasive.
The State’s argument that “Curtis was clear to testify that expenses he labeled as
‘questionable’ could be legitimate” misses the point. SB, 60. Curtis’s concession that the
payments could be legitimate mattered little where the jury was left with the impression
that the underlying “cold, hard” bank records themselves flagged certain payments as
questionable. R.6593-94. Curtis’s concession based on his subjective opinion could not
ameliorate the damage done by the summaries, which the jury would understand as
objective evidence. In fact, the State argued that the records “don’t have a motive. Their
credibility’s not at issue. [They] are cold, hard facts.” R.6593-94.
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The State also argues that the summaries labeled some expenses at “potentially
legitimate” and thus, gave Buttars favorable evidence as well. SB, 60. Categorizing a
small number of transactions as “potentially legitimate” is hardly favorable. On the
contrary, labeling the transactions as only “potentially legitimate” undermined the notion
that the payments were actually legitimate. The State also argues that counsel used the
“questionable” categorization to its advantage by showing that Curtis did not know what
the “questionable” payments were for. SB, 60. Again, this misses the point. If the jury
believed that the objective bank records themselves flagged certain payments as
questionable, Curtis’s concessions would be of little consequence. Failing to object
created a high risk that the jury would accept the State’s opinions as objective evidence.
It is not reasonable trial strategy to allow a situation where the jury had no reliable way to
discern the State’s opinions from fact.
The State also relies on Spaulding, 894 F.3d 174, arguing that “similar inferences
contained in rule 1006 summaries [have been found] to be harmless.” SB, 62. But
Spaulding is distinguishable in two ways. First, the underlying bank records were in
evidence and available for the jury to review. Spalding, 894 F.3d at 186 n.18; Appellee
Br., Spaulding, 894 F.3d 174, 2017 WL 6448026 *29 (“the government offered the
exhibits from which the information in the charts were drawn”). Second, each time the
trial court admitted a challenged summary, it gave a cautionary instruction that stated:
“[T]hese documents are summary documents of other records and express the conclusion
of [a] witness... It is up to you to determine if these summaries and conclusions are
accurate. The best evidence of what occurred are the underlying records themselves.”
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Spalding, 894 F.3d at 186 n.18. No such cautionary instruction was given in this case.
And the general instruction on expert testimony that was given—which told the jury that
they did “not have to accept an expert’s opinion” and could give it “whatever weight you
think it deserves”—was of little value. R.1391. Indeed, without the underlying bank
records, the jury was unable to ferret out the opinions that the instruction told them they
could reject. U.S. v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 311, 316 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that
summaries “premised on the government's assumptions permissible as long as supporting
evidence has been presented” and reversing where summary “did not accurately reflect
the underlying testimony”). Accordingly, Buttars was prejudiced by the embellished
summaries.
II. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by proposing/allowing an incorrect
instruction on the definition of “willfulness.”
Contrary to the State’s suggestions, this Court may hold that trial counsel was
ineffective notwithstanding the conscious avoidance/ignorance language in State v.
Moore, 2015 UT App 112, 349 P.3d 797. The State is also wrong to claim that Buttars’s
exceptional circumstances argument was inadequately briefed and that the conscious
avoidance/ignorance language was nonprejudicial.
The State asserts that trial counsel did not perform ineffectively because “case law
at the time support[ed] his course of conduct.” SB 67. But the ineffective assistance
analysis does not necessarily hinge on the legal landscape at time of trial, as clarified by
our supreme court in State v. Silva, 2019 UT 36. There our supreme court “repudiate[d]
[] language in [its] case law limiting [its] review of an attorney’s performance to the law
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in effect at the time of trial” and determined that an attorneys’ performance is not to be
based solely on settled law. Id. ¶¶19-20. Thus, the ineffective assistance analysis does not
end simply because Instruction 42 contained language that mirrored dicta in Moore, 2015
UT App 112, ¶17. As argued in opening, the conscious avoidance/ignorance language
lifted from Moore was non binding dicta; it incorrectly described the willfulness
requirement; and it had the effect of reducing the State’s burden of proof. OB, 49-57.
Under these circumstances, counsel performed deficiently by submitting the conscious
avoidance/ignorance language to the jury.
In any event, this Court may review this issue under the exceptional circumstances
doctrine—an argument the State incorrectly characterizes as inadequately briefed. SB, 65
n.5. This Court may deem an issue inadequately briefed if the argument contains “no
citations to authority to support [the] claim,” State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58,¶25 n.5,
218 P.3d 590, or “when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the
burden of research and argument to the… court.” State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305
(Utah 1988). Barring substantial inadequacies, this Court “will not automatically decline
to address an issue on the basis of inadequate briefing.” 2010-1RADC/CADC Venture v.
Dos Lagos, 2017 UT 29, ¶30 n.8, 408 P.3d 313. Rather, adequate briefing “is a ‘natural
extension of an appellant’s burden of persuasion.’” Id. (quoting State v. Roberts, 2015
UT 24, ¶18, 345 P.3d 1226. Ultimately, “[t]he focus should be on the merits.” State v.
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶42, 326 P.3d 645.
Here, Buttars adequately briefed his exceptional circumstances argument. He cited
relevant case law, applied that law to the circumstances of this case, and developed
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reasons as to why unique procedural circumstances exist here. OB, 57-58. Accordingly,
the Court may reach the merits of this claim.
Furthermore, the State is wrong to suggest that the instruction was nonprejudicial
because the conscious avoidance/ignorance language was not at issue. It contends that the
evidence revealed that “Buttars made untrue statements and had actual knowledge of
material facts that he did not tell investors in order to make what he did tell them not
misleading.” SB, 68. But as discussed in opening, the evidence was not as
straightforward as the State suggests. OB, 58-60. The evidence described in opening
paints a picture of a defendant who had minimal interaction with the investors and who
did not actually know what Gerritsen and LaCount did and did not tell investors. See id.
For instance, if Buttars consciously avoided the possibility that LaCount did not tell the
investors about Ellipse, then the jury could infer Buttars had actual knowledge that the
investors had not been informed about the past company. To provide another example: If
Buttars believed his assertion that the investment would be “used to bring [the product] to
market,” but consciously avoided a possibility that the money would be used differently,
then the jury could infer Buttars actually knew the money would be used in other ways.
This allowed the jury to find a misstatement where none would otherwise be found.
These are just a few examples, but they serve to show that the conscious avoidance
language mattered and prejudiced Buttars.
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III. This Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts because the State
presented expert testimony, argument, and jury instructions that misstated the law
surrounding a defendant’s disclosure obligations under the securities fraud statute.
This reply challenges the State’s arguments regarding Instruction 47, which
incorrectly stated that a mere finding of “willful material… omissions” meant that it did
not matter if Buttars believed what he said about future events. R.1419. The opening brief
adequately addresses the State’s arguments regarding the improper expert testimony and
prosecutorial argument, as well as prejudice.
Buttars’s honest beliefs did not constitute a defense only if he willfully violated
the securities statute by misstating or omitting material facts necessary to correct a
misleading predicate statement. Utah Code §61-1-1(2). Instruction 47 omitted the
italicized language. The State argues that counsel could reasonably decide to withhold an
objection to the omission on the basis that the jury was properly instructed elsewhere and
the omission was just a “common abbreviation.” SB 73-75. It is incorrect.
No amount of instructions correctly stating the elements of securities fraud can
cure an instruction that incorrectly describes when a certain defense may be invoked.
Indeed, the real problem with Instruction 47 is that it incorrectly shut down an otherwise
viable defense, regardless of the utterance of any misleading omissions. The availability
of particular defense is a matter separate from the elements and instructions purporting to
describe the operation of a defense must be drafted with precision. And contrary to the
State’s suggestion, there is a difference between an “abbreviation” and an incomplete
recitation of the circumstances under which a defense is allowed. Abbreviations are fine
if they correctly encapsulate all the necessary legal concepts, but that was not the case
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here. Thus, Instruction 47 was incorrect and any failure to properly object constituted
deficient performance.
IV. This Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts because the State’s
experts gave testimony that violated rules 702, 704, and 403.
A. Lloyd’s testimony violated rules 702 and 704.
Contrary to the State’s claim, State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) and
State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) do not help its case. Moreover,
Buttars’s rule 702 arguments are preserved and adequately briefed. The opening brief
adequately addresses prejudice.
The State argues that Larsen “held that ‘Rule 704 permits [an expert] to express an
opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of that disputed issue’—whether misstatements
or omitted facts are material.” SB, 82. But the Larsen court did not condone expert
testimony that uses the term “material” in its legal sense. On the contrary, Larsen said
that the State’s expert “certainly should have avoided employing the specific term
‘material.’” 865 P.2d at 1362. Nevertheless, the expert in Larsen “seem[ed] to use
‘material’ as a synonym for ‘important.’” Id. Thus, the Larsen court held based on the
facts of the case that the use of the term “material” was not “an ‘inadmissible legal
conclusion’” because the expert did not use the term in its legal sense. Id. at 1361-63.
As explained in opening, Lloyd—unlike the Larsen expert—used the term
“material” in its legal sense, giving a definition of the term that mirrored the legal
definition given set forth in the instructions. R.1416. Accordingly, the testimony was
improper under Larsen.
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Harry does not help the State’s case either. There, the State testified “to the
materiality of information that [the defendant] allegedly failed to reveal” to investors.
Harry, 873 P.2d at 1152. It appears that as in Larsen, the Harry expert used the term
“material” as a synonym for “important.” Id. at 1152-54. There is no indication that the
Harry expert gave a legal definition of material as was the case here. See OB, 68. Thus,
this case is distinguishable from Larsen and Harry because Lloyd used the term material
in its legal sense.
Moreover, contrary to the State’s claims, Buttars adequately briefed and preserved
an argument under rule 702. In opening, Buttars developed his argument by citing case
law, including citations to the record, and pointing to certain considerations that the trial
court did not adequately weigh. 3 See Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶25 n.5; Thomas, 961
P.2d at 305; Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶18. Buttars’s rule 702 argument was adequately
briefed, and this Court should “focus… on the merits.” Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶42.
Buttars also preserved this issue by timely arguing that the materiality question
was “squarely within the layman’s understanding.” R.4827. This is the same argument on
appeal. OB, 69-70. Buttars also reasserted his objection after Lloyd testified. R.5225-26.
Accordingly, this Court should reach the merits of the rule 702 issue.
B. Curtis’s testimony violated rules 702, 704, and 403.
The State is wrong to assert that Curtis did not “discuss Utah statutes.” SB 85.
Moreover, this Court should reject the State’s arguments and consider the merits of

The trial court’s ruling on helpfulness in many ways overlaps with other aspects
of its ruling that Buttars challenges on appeal.
3
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Buttars’s claims under rules 702 and 403. The opening brief adequately addresses
prejudice.
First, Curtis’s opinions pertained to Utah statutes. The prosecutor asked Curtis if
he had “particular experience investigating and analyzing records of companies or
individuals alleged to have engaged in fraud, deceit, or theft.” R.5227-28 (emphasis
added). From this, it is evident that the terms “fraud, deceit, or theft” were being used in
reference to the statutory crimes that Buttars was “alleged to have engaged in.” R.522728. Moreover, as argued in opening, Curtis further offered a legal interpretation of these
terms by providing case-specific examples of “characteristics” used “to determine” fraud,
deceit, or theft. R.5227-28. Accordingly, Curtis tethered his testimony to Utah law. 4
The State also argues that Buttars failed to preserve an objection under rule 403.
SB, 85 n.7. Part of Buttars’s objection to Curtis’s testimony was that “it’s prejudicial
under 403 considering the sequencing of the questions and where we’re at in the
questioning.” R.5222. Buttars gave the court an opportunity to rule on the issue and
properly preserved an objection under rule 403. Buttars likewise adequately briefed his
rule 702 argument. It was appropriate to brief the rule 702 and 403 challenges together
because the 702 analysis involves a balancing that “mimics that under rule 403.” Larsen,
865 P.2d at 1363 n.12. Moreover, Buttars developed his argument by citing case law,

This case is also distinguishable from State v. Brown, 2019 UT App 122. There,
this court determined that expert opinion testimony was admissible where “the
information provided was general and not tied to a specific law.” Id. ¶32. Here, by
contrast, Curtis tied his opinion to a specific law because his opinions concerned the
statutory crimes that Buttars was “alleged to have engaged in.” R.5227-28.
4
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citing the record, and pointing to certain considerations that the trial court did not fully
weigh. See Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ,r18. Thus, this Court should reject the State's
arguments and consider the merits of his rule 403 and 702 arguments.
CO CLUSION
For the reasons here and in opening, Buttars asks this Court to reverse and remand
for a new trial on all counts.
SUBMITTED this

3of11 of September 2019.

xandra S. McCallu
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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